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<a> 1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will look at the content of Facebook accounts in terms of private messages, 
images, videos, status updates, personal data and information, and the relevant post-mortem 
issues from a user’s perspective, such as transmission of Facebook content on death, privacy, 
copyright. User accounts will be explored in their relation to terms of service, and in so far as 
they restrict/enable access to this content. 
 Facebook has the largest user base1 and so it has a significant social importance.2 In the 
first eight years of Facebook’s existence, 30 million of its users died, with an average of 428 
users dying every day.3 These accounts are then memorialised (if requested, see Section 2 
below), removed or just remain on Facebook’s platform.4 
 Some of the main issues in this area are related to the question whether the content and/or 
user’s account can be considered property or whether an alternative legal doctrine is better 
suited to describe this content. User accounts are initially created through contracts between 
service providers and users, and it is clear that the account itself and the underlying software 
is property/intellectual property (IP) of the service provider. However, as demonstrated later 
in this chapter, the legal nature of this content is not as clear. If it is an object of property, then 
the content transmits on death, through one’s will or intestate succession (see Section 2). 
Conversely, if the content is not property stricto sensu, then it can be protected by copyright 
and arguably transmits on death. For published content, this is quite simple, but the issues 
arise with the unpublished content on Facebook, as demonstrated in Section 3. In addition, a 
lot of the content is merely personal data and information (see Section 4). This type of content 
                                              
1 See eg Statista, ‘Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 4th Quarter 2015 (in Millions)’ 
<www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/>. All websites last 
accessed 8 August 2016. 
2 Statista, ‘Distribution of Global Social Content Sharing Activity as of 4th Quarter 2015, by Social Network’ 
<www.statista.com/statistics/283889/content-sharing-primary-social-networks-worldwide/>. 
3 WebpageFX Team, ‘What Happens to Your Online Presence When You Die? [Infographic]’ (WebpageFX, 18 
June 2014) <www.webpagefx.com/blog/internet/happens-online-presence-die-infographic/>. 
4 This is the most likely scenario; though there is a lack of empirical data to prove this. 
 
cannot be considered property, and therefore cannot be transmitted through the usual 
mechanism of succession law and probate. 
 This chapter argues that the law in this area needs updating to allow a deceased user’s 
family to acquire IP rights to user unpublished content on Facebook, without allowing the 
family to access and use the actual account. This should be done through in-service solutions, 
with the deceased’s consent (akin to Facebook Legacy Account, see Section 3). For the non-
copyrightable content, the chapter argues that the law should prevent the deceased’s family 
from controlling his/her account and personal data (as a matter of post-mortem privacy, see 
Section 4). In this regard, the author welcomes technological solutions, but argues for their 
legal recognition and more consistency in the service provider’s terms of service. User 
accounts are looked at holistically in this chapter, as is the content shared within an account. 
Therefore, content available and accessible elsewhere (such as published copyrighted content) 
is not a significant concern for the purpose of this discussion. 
<b>1.1 Illustrations 
Although there has not been comprehensive relevant litigation in the UK or the US, the 
following examples serve to illustrate some of the issues around transmission of Facebook 
content on death, such as property, privacy and jurisdiction. 
 In one of the first cases reported by news media, Karen Williams, the mother of Loren 
Williams who died in 2005 at the age of 22, requested access to her son’s Facebook account5 
when she could no longer log in.6 Through her lawyer an agreement with Facebook was 
reached and a court order was obtained in 2007, giving effect to the agreement and allowing 
the mother to access her deceased son’s account for a period of 10 months.7 As Facebook’s 
policy and terms of service currently stand, Karen would not be able to gain access to Loren’s 
account if this transpired today (see Section 2). 
 Another case concerns John Berlin, the father of Jesse who died in 2012 at the age of 22, 
and his request, directed to Facebook’s founder, to create a ‘Look Back’ video for his 
                                              
5 Lauren Gambino, ‘In Death, Facebook Photos Could Fade Away Forever’ (Associated Press, 1 March 2013) 
<www.yahoo.com/news/death-facebook-photos-could-fade-away-forever-085129756--finance.html>. 
6 ‘Karen Williams’ Facebook Saga Raises Question of Whether Users’ Profiles Are Part of “Digital Estates”’ 
(The Huffington Post, 15 March 2012) . 
 
7 Ibid. 
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deceased son. The father did not have access to his son’s account and thus he could not create 
one himself. After widespread media support, Facebook agreed to create one on his behalf 
using content that Jesse had posted publicly, in accordance with Facebook policy to protect 
users’ privacy even upon death. There have reportedly been other cases where deceased users’ 
videos have been provided to their families upon request. The request for a Look Back video 
has now been incorporated in Facebook’s terms, but such a request is only available to the 
deceased user’s Facebook ‘friends’ (see Section 2). 
 The case of Sahar Daftary, who died at the age of 23 in the UK, concerns the deceased’s 
family application to subpoena the records from her Facebook account, as they believed that it 
‘contain[ed] critical evidence showing her actual state of mind in the days leading up to her 
death’ which could be used in proceedings in the UK.8 This followed Facebook’s refusal to 
grant access without a court order. While this case raises interesting jurisdictional issues, 
these are beyond the scope of this chapter.9 Importantly, this case serves as an example where 
precedence has been given to the deceased’s privacy over the claimed property right of the 
family and heirs, which will be further explored in Section 4. The Northern District of 
California Court found that the US Stored Communications Act10 prevents a US service 
provider like Facebook from disclosing stored communications in civil proceedings in the US, 
as well as for the purposes of foreign proceedings.11 The court also noted in an obiter dictum 
that Facebook could disclose the records to the family voluntarily in accordance with the Act. 
However, it has not been reported if Facebook has done so (see Section 2 and Facebook’s 
terms of use). 
<a> 2. FACEBOOK TERMS OF SERVICE: OWNERSHIP AND DEATH 
This section will analyse the allocation of ownership/property/copyright in the user’s 
Facebook contents, if any, as established by the service provider contract. The discussion will 
note some problems with regard to considering Facebook content as property, as well as some 
specific post-mortem issues arising from Facebook’s terms of service. This is significant as all 
property forms inheritance, an estate of a person, and transmits by the rules of succession to 
the deceased’s heirs. In the UK, for instance, ‘a person’s estate is the aggregate of all the 
                                              
8 In re Request for Order Requiring Facebook, Inc to Produce Documents and Things, C 12-80171 LHK (PSG) 
(ND California; September 20, 2012). 
9 For more on this topic, see Alex Mills, Chapter 13 in this volume. 
10 18 USC §2701. 
11 See Request for Order (n 8) 2, citing Theofel v Farley-Jones, 359 F3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir 2004). 
property to which he is beneficially entitled’.12 Or, in the US, ‘probate assets are those assets 
of the decedent, includible in the gross estate under IRC §2033, that were held in his or her 
name at the time of death’.13 
 Conversely, obligations in principle do not persist on demise. In common law jurisdictions 
purely personal obligations ‘die with a person’.14 This position has been revised and most of 
the personal rights of action arising from torts survive on death. The only one that would not 
persist is defamation. As for contractual rights, personal contracts (eg employment contracts, 
contracts between an artist and a person commissioning him) will be discharged on death, 
unless there is an opposite provision in the contract.15 A contract which is not personal in 
nature is not discharged upon death, and it will survive for the benefit of the estate.16 A 
personal representative stands in the position of the deceased, without being a party to the 
contract.17 This analysis is important as a Facebook contract is personal in nature and it is 
interesting to explore whether and how it persists on death, as it currently reads. 
 Facebook’s terms of use and privacy policy are known as the Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities and the Data Use Policy.18 In addition, the labyrinth of terms governing 
users’ behaviour on Facebook is also found in other specific terms, policy documents, 
guidelines and forms, as is the case for Facebook’s policy for deceased users.19 These terms 
are often revised and proposed changes are posted to the Facebook Site Governance page a 
minimum of seven days before the change is effective.20 
 In its terms of service, Facebook clearly refers to the ownership of user-generated content 
as belonging to users, with the option to control it through privacy and app settings.21 This 
term appears permissive and seems to cover virtually any material posted on Facebook, 
                                              
12 Inheritance Tax Act, s 5(1), applicable to England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; Wills Act 1837, s 3 
(this Act does not extend its effect to Scotland); similarly, Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, s 32. 
13 Jonathan J Darrow and Gerald R Ferrera, ‘Who Owns a Decedent’s E-Mails: Inheritable Probate Assets or 
Property of the Network?’ (2006) 10 NYUJ Legis & Pub Pol’y 281; see also eg Laura McKinnon, ‘Planning for 
the Succession of Digital Assets’ (2011) 27 CLSR 362, 362–67. 
14 Principle Actio personalis moritur cum persona in Beker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 439, 170 ER 1033, but see the 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 (as amended); for a comparison between US and German 
perspectives, see eg Hannes Rosler, ‘Dignitarian Posthumous Personality Rights – An Analysis of U.S. and 
German Constitutional and Tort Law (2008) 26 Berkeley J Int’l L 153. 
15 See Farrow v Wilson (1868–69) LR 4 CP 744, 746. 
16 See Law Reform Act 1934, s 1(1) and Sugden v Sugden (1957) P 120. 
17 Beswick v Beswick [1966] Ch 538 (CA), or for commentary about the contracts and succession, see Anthony R 
Mellows, The Law of Succession (4th edn, Butterworths 1983) 295–96. 
18 Facebook, ‘Terms: Statement of Rights and Responsibilities’ <www.facebook.com/legal/terms>. 
19 ibid s 18. 
20 ibid s 13. Users must ‘like’ the page in order to receive a notification on their timeline. 
21 ibid. 
including users’ personal data.22 However, looking at the very broad licence that the user 
gives Facebook for using his content, this control does not appear to be as strong as initially 
stated.23 For instance, if a user wishes to remove his content, the user cannot be certain 
whether the content has actually been removed and what the ‘reasonable amount of time’ for 
which this content can persist really means.24 Also, the use Facebook makes of this particular 
content is unclear. Furthermore, while the user seemingly retains control and can remove the 
content at any time, that is not the case with the account. The essential issue relating to 
transmission on death and the non-proprietary nature of the account is the non-transferability 
of Facebook accounts. Facebook’s terms state that the agreement ‘does not confer any third 
party beneficiary rights’.25 A Facebook account is non-transferable, including any ‘page’ or 
‘application’ users administer, without Facebook’s written permission.26 There is a clear 
prohibition on impersonation (using another user’s account pretending you are that user), as 
password sharing is prohibited and users are also banned from letting anyone else access their 
account.27 
 Therefore, whereas Facebook notes that the user owns content, Facebook owns the account, 
and we can identify the same legal implications as in email accounts.28 However, this position 
is understandable, as the user is actually using proprietary software that enables posting and 
sharing of his content. 
 It is disputable whether these terms are enforceable at all, especially the ones outside the 
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (the core of Facebook’s terms of service). The issues 
of incorporation of contractual terms might arise here and deem these terms, including the 
ones relating to the post-mortem transmission, unenforceable or unconscionable.29 In this 
                                              
22 See ibid s 17 (Definitions). 
23 ibid. 
24 ibid s 2. 
25 ibid s 18.9. 
26 ibid s 4.9. 
27 ibid s 4.8. 
28 Edina Harbinja, ‘Legal Nature of Emails: A Comparative Perspective’ (2016) 14 Duke L & Tech Rev 227, 
254–55. 
29 Eg the requirement that these are brought to a user’s attention before or at the time of the formation of 
contract, ie when the user signs up to use Facebook. See Olley v Marlborough Court Ltd [1949] 1 KB 532 or 
Parker v South Eastern Railway Co (1877) 2 CPD 416. In the lack of these requirements, the terms would be 
deemed unenforceable. Unconscionability generally, on the other hand, remains a controversial topic in English 
law. See, for example, Stephen A Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract (OUP, 2005), 308–
313.For a US view, see Steven Hetcher, ‘User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part Two – 
Agreements Between Users and Mega-Sites’ (2008) 24 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech LJ 829; Ryan J 
Casamiquela, ‘Contractual Assent and Enforceability in Cyberspace’ (2002) 17 Berkeley Tech LJ 475, 495; Paul 
J Morrow, ‘Cyberlaw: The Unconscionability/Unenforceability of Contracts (Shrink-Wrap, Clickwrap, and 
Browse-Wrap) on the Internet: A Multijurisdictional Analysis Showing the Need for Oversight’ (2011) 11 
particular case, it would be incorporation by reference, and Facebook has not taken 
appropriate steps to bring this to users’ attention, as required by the law. Finally, there would 
be an issue of lack of consideration for the formation of a valid contract in English law. 
Facebook users, arguably, do not provide any tangible consideration, but it could arguably 
encompass personal data, used as valuable resources; their users are trading for having their 
Facebook account.30 Bearing in mind all these issues then, a question remains as to whether 
some of these forms and policies and terms are ‘merely statements of good practice’ rather 
than binding contractual terms.31 
 Moving on to specific terms relating to deceased users, it is important to note at the outset 
that there is no provision that expressly terminates the contract between Facebook and a 
deceased user. Facebook terms do not expressly mention deceasedsdeceaseds’ accounts and 
the policy is set out on their help pages and refers to the ‘memorialization’ process and 
deletion of the deceased’s account.32 The inclusion of the memorialisation option in 
Facebook’s terms resulted from a personal loss of a Facebook employee.33 This once more 
confirms the usual practice of dealing with digital assets on death: leveraging circumstances 
such as media coverage or personal losses of employees have prompted ad hoc solutions. 
 The effect of memorialisation is that it prevents anyone from logging in to the account, 
even those with valid login information and password.34 Any user can send a private message 
to a memorialised account. Content that the deceased shared, while alive, remains visible to 
                                              
PJTLP 7; Susan E Gindin, ‘Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? Lessons Learned and 
Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears’ (2009) 8 NJTIP 1 [56]; For a comparative outlook see 
Phillip Johnson, ‘All Wrapped Up? A Review of the Enforceability of “Shrink-wrap” and “Click-wrap” Licences 
in the United Kingdom and the United States’ (2003) 25 EIPR 98; Hasan A Deveci, ‘Consent in Online 
Contracts: Old Wine in New Bottles’ (2007) 13 CTLR 2231. 
30 On the sufficiency of consideration in English law, see eg White v Bluett (1853) 23 LJ Ex 36, Currie v 
Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153, Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847, Chappell & 
Co Ltd v Nestle Co Ltd [1960] AC 87. Arguably therefore, personal data would represent sufficient 
consideration, given their importance and prominence in the online advertising, and the revenues Facebook has 
as a result of selling these data to the advertisers. It would be interesting to see the English courts’ view on this. 
However, on the other hand, it would not be a problem in Scots law and civilian legal systems, which do not 
require consideration as an essential element for the formation of contracts. 
31 Lilian Edwards and Edina Harbinja, ‘What Happens to My Facebook Profile When I Die? Legal Issues 
Around Transmission of Digital Assets on Death’ in Cristiano Maciel and Vinicius Carvalho Pereira (eds), 
Digital Legacy and Interaction: Post-Mortem Issues (Springer 2013).  
32 In the earlier version of the terms, Facebook only referred to the memorialisation process using vague terms 
(‘we may memorialize your account’) – for more on this, see Damien McCallig, ‘Facebook After Death: An 
Evolving Policy in a Social Network’ (2013) IJLIT 1, 8. 
33 Kathy H Chan, ‘Memories of Friends Departed Endure on Facebook’ (Facebook, 26 October 2009) 
<www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/memories-of-friends-departed-endure-on-facebook/163091042130>. 
34 For the development of memorialisation as an option, see McCallig (n 30) 11–12. 
those it was shared with (privacy settings remain ‘as is’).35 In allowing privacy settings to 
remain post mortem, Facebook claims that it wishes to respect the privacy of the deceased. 
Depending on the privacy settings, confirmed friends may still post to the deceased’s timeline. 
Accounts that are memorialised no longer appear in the ‘people you may know’ 
notifications.36 In addition, memorialisation prevents the tagging of the deceased in future 
Facebook posts, photographs or any other content.37 Unfriending (removing someone from 
one’s friends list) a deceased person’s memorialised account is permanent38 and a friend 
cannot be added to a memorialised account or profile, which might be an issue for parents of 
deceased children who may not have added their parents as friends while alive.39 As McCallig 
notes, however, ‘it is not entirely clear whether Facebook would consider (or more 
importantly grant) a “special request” to be added as a friend if made, for example, by a 
bereaved parent’ (as it met the request of Mr Berlin and the access to his son’s ‘Look Back’ 
video, see Section 1.1).40 ‘Special request’ can also be used for a variety of other purposes, 
including asking any question in relation to the profile or if a friend wishes to obtain a Look 
Back video.41 Look Back video is available at the request of any of the deceased’s Facebook 
friends and Facebook promises to send the link to this video, which cannot be edited or 
shared.42 Again, Facebook justifies these restrictions by invoking privacy of the deceased 
user.43 This therefore changes Facebook’s position set out in Section 1.1 and Mr Berlin would 
not be able access the Look Back video according to the new terms. 
 Furthermore, when requesting content from the deceased’s account, Facebook does not 
guarantee that they will be able to provide the requested content and note that they might 
require the person submitting the request to obtain a court order.44 The help page then links to 
                                              
35 Initially, it was only visible to the user’s friends, but this changed in February 2014, see Liz Fields, ‘Facebook 
Changes Access to Profiles of Deceased’ (ABC News, 22 February 2014) 
<http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/facebook-access-profiles-deceased/story?id=22632425>; Chris Price and 
Alex DiSclafani, ‘Remembering Our Loved Ones’ (Facebook Newsroom, 21 February 2014) 
<http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2014/02/remembering-our-loved-ones/>. 
36 Facebook, Help Center, ‘What Will Happen to My Account if I Pass Away?’ 
<www.facebook.com/help/103897939701143/>. 
37 Stephanie Buck, ‘How 1 Billion People Are Coping with Death and Facebook’ (MashableUK, 13 February 
2013) <http://mashable.com/2013/02/13/facebook-after-death/>. 
38 ‘Nebraska is Latest State to Address Digital Legacy’ (Death and Digital Legacy.com, 20 February 2012) 
<www.deathanddigitallegacy.com/2012/02/20/nebraska-is-latest-state-to-address-digital-legacy/>. 
39 Facebook, ‘Special Request for Deceased Person’s Account’ 
<www.facebook.com/help/contact/228813257197480>. 
40 McCallig (n 30) 10. 
41 Facebook, ‘Special Request’ (n 37). 
42 Facebook, Help Center, ‘Deactivating & Deleting Accounts’ <www.facebook.com/help/359046244166395/>. 
43 ibid. 
44 Facebook, Help Center, ‘How Do I Request Content from the Account of a Deceased Person?’ 
<www.facebook.com/help/123355624495297>. 
a request form, which asks a number questions and requests submission of proofs of 
identity.45 It is worth noting this is much more definite than the old version of the request, 
which permitted a request on the basis of an obituary.46 As stated above, even after this 
procedure and the provision of documents, Facebook does not guarantee fulfilment of this 
request. 
 With regard to deactivation and removal of a deceased’s account, the procedure is even 
more complex and vague. Facebook provides for this option, but with very general statements 
and vague criteria, calling this a ‘special request’.47 The option is available only to ‘verified 
immediate family members’ or an executor and the relationship to the deceased needs to be 
verified. Again, Facebook only promises that it will ‘process’ these requests, without giving a 
firm promise of fulfilling special requests. 
 Researchers argue that the procedure for removal of a deceased user’s profile is 
incongruous with Facebook’s purpose and features (primarily keeping in touch with one’s 
friends). Kasket, for instance, questions the ‘right’ of parents (often not users’ friends on 
Facebook) to request permanent removal, when this digital bond with friends on Facebook is 
stronger, and their profiles are essentially co-constructed (through tagging, sharing, re-posting 
etc).48 Pennington, although looking at a small sample size, finds that all her college-student 
research participants had never unfriended a deceased user, although the reasons given for not 
doing so varied.49 Research also finds that most Facebook users do not have their parents or 
children on their friends list, but 93 per cent of them do have other relatives on their friends 
list.50 A vast majority of users are connected to their offline friends, and only a small 
percentage have befriended individuals they have never met offline.51 Deactivation and 
                                              
45 Facebook, ‘Requesting Content from a Deceased Person’s Account’ 
<www.facebook.com/help/contact/398036060275245>. 
46 Katie Notopoulos, ‘How Almost Anyone Can Take You Off Facebook (And Lock You Out)’ (BuzzFeed, 4 
January 2014) <www.buzzfeed.com/katienotopoulos/how-to-murder-your-friends-on-facebook-in-2-easy-
s#.xbLyLygo2>; Jack Schofield, ‘What Happens to Your Facebook Account when You Die?’ (The Guardian, 30 
October 2014) <www.theguardian.com/technology/askjack/2014/oct/30/what-happens-to-your-facebook-
account-when-you-or-a-loved-one-dies>. 
47 Facebook, Help Center, ‘How Do I Ask a Question about a Deceased Person’s Account on Facebook?’ 
<www.facebook.com/help/265593773453448>. 
48 Elaine Kasket, ‘Access to the Digital Self in Life and Death: Privacy in the Context of Posthumously 
Persistent Facebook Profiles’ (2013) 10 SCRIPTed 7. 
49 Natalie Pennington, ‘You Don’t De-Friend the Dead: An Analysis of Grief Communication by College 
Students Through Facebook Profiles’ (2013) 37 Death Studies 617, 625. 
50 Maeve Duggan, Nicole B Ellison, Cliff Lampe, Amanda Lenhart and Mary Madden, ‘Demographics of Key 
Social Networking Platforms’ (Pew Research Center, 9 January 2015) 
<www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/09/demographics-of-key-social-networking-platforms-2/>. 
51 ibid. 
removal, therefore, even more than memorialisation, pose a question of reconciling the 
interests of a deceased user’s family, friends and his interests. Is it in a user’s interest to allow 
family members who are not on his friends lists in these co-constructed profiles to request 
deletion of such a profile and loss of the valuable materials for other users without a user 
expressing his wish in this direction? The chapter will return to this question again later in 
Section 4. 
 More recently, Facebook seems to have followed Google’s lead and the introduction of the 
Inactive Account Manager52 with its ‘Legacy Contact’.53 As of 12 February 2015, Facebook 
allows its users to designate a friend or family member to be their ‘Facebook estate executor’ 
(an executor for their Facebook content only, as envisaged by the service) and manage their 
account after they have died. A Legacy Contact has a limited number of options: to write a 
post to display at the top of the memorialised timeline; to respond to new friend requests; and 
to update the profile picture and cover photo of a deceased user.54 In addition, a user ‘may 
give their legacy contact permission to download an archive of the photos, posts and profile 
information they shared on Facebook’.55 A Legacy Contact will not be able to log in to the 
account or see the private messages of the deceased. All the other settings will remain the 
same as before memorialisation of the account. Finally, an option is that a user decides to 
permanently delete his/her account after their death.56 The rationale behind this feature, 
according to Facebook, is to support both the grieving individuals (it is not clear whether 
family, friends, or all of them) and the users who want to take more control over what 
happens to their account on death.57 
 This move from Facebook is, admittedly, a welcome development for users. It does shift 
the balance of interests from family and next of kin to users. Users now have control over 
who their Legacy Contact is and this can only be one of their Facebook friends. A Legacy 
Contact does not take too much control over the deceased’s account, as they cannot post on 
behalf of the user (apart from the one message in remembrance and changing the timeline and 
profile picture) and they need a permission to download an archive of the deceased user’s 
                                              
52 Google, Accounts Help, ‘About Inactive Account Manager’ (for trusted contacts) 
<https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3036546?hl=en>. 
53 Vanessa Callison-Burch, Jasmine Probst, and Mark Govea, ‘Adding a Legacy Contact’ (Facebook Newsroom, 
12 February 2015) <http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/02/adding-a-legacy-contact/>. 
54 ibid. 
55 ibid. 
56 ibid. 
57 ibid. 
content. It is, however, unclear whether this permission includes all the content or some 
categories. Also, one of the issues is the obscure place of this option (user needs to click on 
‘Settings’, ‘Security’, then choose ‘Legacy Contact’ at the bottom of the page).58 The question 
remains whether this option will trump the options heirs and next of kin have according to the 
policy of removal, special requests and memorialisation. Facebook needs to make this very 
clear in their terms of service, so as to fulfil their promises to the users. Also, there might be 
issues with conflicting interests as between heirs/families and a friend designated as a Legacy 
Contact and having an option to download the archive of the deceased’s content. For instance, 
if the heirs inherit copyright in the user’s works, and the Legacy Contact has acquired this 
content with the permission of the user, will this content be exempt from the provisions of the 
will/intestacy laws. With this option, Facebook notably shifts the balance and accounts more 
for the deceased’s interests and decisions made before death. However, the balance remains 
unclear and a welcome move might end up in a series of legal issues and disputes. 
 The analysis in this section therefore outlines inconsistencies in Facebook’s terms with 
regard to ownership of users’ content and accounts from a contract law position and the 
internal coherence of these terms. It does not, however, mean that the chapter suggests that 
actual content is or should be of a proprietary nature. This issue is explored in the following 
section, from a property and IP law perspective. Therefore, even if Facebook recognises 
ownership over the content, this is not ownership in the property law sense, as seen in Section 
3. The author further argues in Section 4 that the proprietary nature is not only inadequate 
from the current legal position, but also undesirable from a post-mortem privacy, ethical 
(autonomy) and policy perspective. 
<a> 3. REVISITING THE LEGAL NATURE OF FACEBOOK CONTENT 
After having established the contractual position of Facebook content, the author considers 
two alternate paradigms as to the nature of Facebook content to determine whether the content 
transmits on death.59 These are: (1) this content is protected by copyright as literary or artistic 
works; (2) the content is property. Prima facie, this content predominantly includes literary 
and artistic works created by their authors and copyright appears to be one of the most 
obvious answers when determining the legal nature of social network sites (SNSs). 
                                              
58 ibid. 
59 See also Harbinja (n 26). 
<b>3.1 Copyright on Facebook and Post-mortem Transmission 
Social networks contain vast amounts of potentially or actually copyrighted materials. These 
include, for instance, photos and videos uploaded on Facebook, status updates, notes in the 
form of short stories/comments/poems etc. The question of copyright in the content posted on 
SNSs has been rather straightforward for some US academics, such as Mazzone and Tarney, 
who argue that the content is protected by copyright and should transmit on death 
consequently.60 
 Nevertheless, one should not assume that all the content would automatically qualify for 
copyright protection. This depends on the fulfilment of legal requirements, importantly here 
fixation and originality.61 With regard to the former requirement, it is clear that electronic 
fixation does meet legal requirements of the US and UK copyright law.62 Facebook postings 
are updated and moved from a News Feed and timeline, but they are also rather stable and 
easily retrievable.63 
 The second copyright requirement is originality. If Facebook posts, updates, etc contain 
single words or short phrases/titles, in the US law they would most likely not meet the 
originality requirement. The situation is less clear in the UK and EU law.64 However, unlike 
on Twitter for instance, most of the posts on Facebook are longer than that and most probably 
satisfy this requirement, provided that a user has created them. 
 With regard to photographs, another type of common Facebook content, a similar 
originality threshold is required. In the US, a photograph would be considered original if it 
includes a small degree of composure and positioning.65 Under the UK copyright law, 
photographs are protected as artistic works under section 4 of the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988 (CDPA 1988). The UK requirement for originality has been similar to the 
US one (the labour and skill or ‘sweat of the brow’ test), but differs from the Court of Justice 
                                              
60 Digital works are eligible for copyright protection, 17 USC §102(a) (2006). See also 17 USC §101. See eg 
Jason Mazzone, ‘Facebook’s Afterlife’ (2012) 90 NCL Rev 1643, 1651; Darrow and Ferrera (n 11); Tyler G 
Tarney, ‘A Call for Legislation to Permit the Transfer of Digital Assets at Death’ (2012) 40 Cap U L Rev 773, 
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of the European Union (CJEU) ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ test, which requires a 
higher level of creativity.66 In relation to photographs, in particular, it could be argued that the 
lower threshold of originality remains (including eg composition, positioning the object, 
choice of the angle of shot, lighting and focus, being at the right place at the right time).67 
 Consequently, it can be argued that many of the photos uploaded on Facebook and taken by 
that particular user could be protected by copyright. The remaining unprotected portion of the 
photos is probably very small and it includes, for instance, very ordinary selfies where the 
authors employed an inconsiderable amount of creativity and skills.68 
 A lot of content on Facebook includes cases where users copy someone else’s works, as in 
quotations, links to different content on other websites (news portals, blog posts, quotation 
pages etc), music (usually links to YouTube, Spotify etc), articles (scholarly or news articles), 
photos taken by others etc. This category of content (‘user-uploaded’ or ‘user-copied’ content, 
as opposed to user-generated content) is not in the scope of this chapter, as the focus is on the 
content created by users and not the external content copyrighted by someone else. Users 
would not have any rights in this content and could, potentially, be liable for infringing 
copyright owned by someone else. For this reason, this content is not relevant to the 
discussion around transmission on death. 
 The emphasis of this chapter is on the unpublished works of authorship and materials 
generated and posted on Facebook only, as the other content accessible elsewhere does not 
represent a digital asset stricto sensu, and if published, its transmission is rather 
straightforward.69 Copyright in the EU, UK and US subsists in unpublished works for a period 
equal to the duration of copyright in published works, ie 70 years after the author’s death.70 
Historically, the copyright protection of unpublished work was perpetual in the common law 
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jurisdictions, the UK and the US.71 This has been changed and the duration has been 
harmonised at the EU level, as well as with the US law.72 Additionally, an important change 
in the EU copyright law resulted in incentivising the publication of unpublished works. The 
EU Copyright Term Directive, and consequently the UK law,73 awarded 25 years of copyright 
protection for the first lawful publication of a work previously unpublished, after its copyright 
protection of 70 years has expired.74 
 On Facebook, it is not entirely clear what content would be included in the notion of digital 
asset, as publishing to a limited number of people is not making the content available to the 
public.75 Therefore, where users’ privacy settings are set to ‘friends only’ or ‘only me’, so 
only a limited number of users can access the content, the content is likely to be considered 
unpublished for the purpose of copyright protection. And yet, posting content on Facebook 
relinquishes control over the further ‘publication’ of the content: the item may be shared or 
communicated to those beyond the limited group of individuals to which the item was 
originally shared. But in this case, the work has not been communicated lawfully, so it would 
not affect the nature of it. 
 The unpublished content potentially transmits on death, according to section 93 of the 
CDPA 1988. The requirement is that the beneficiary is entitled by a bequest to ‘an original 
document or other material thing recording or embodying a literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work which was not published before the death of the testator’, and consequently to 
copyright embodied in such a medium. The problem with applying this provision to 
unpublished Facebook content is in the fact that Facebook accounts are not being bequeathed 
and they probably cannot be considered material things or property for the purpose of this 
definition.76 It would be very difficult to interpret this provision to achieve transmission of 
unpublished Facebook works. Even if the will simply says ‘I leave my whole estate to x’ or 
‘the residue’, an ‘estate’ will not be sufficiently wide to include these works. Most of the 
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content, as suggested in the following section, is not property, nor are the underlying 
accounts, as established in the previous section. The requirement of materiality is lacking and 
there is a problem of accessing this copyrightable material due to the contractual limitations. 
This provision needs to be changed, or some technological solutions (eg Legacy Contact) 
need to be recognised as an ‘entitlement’ for the purpose of section 93 of the CDPA 1988. 
 In the US, the federal copyright law does not include similar limitations to the UK ones. 
The US Copyright Act equates transmission of copyright with transmission of personal 
property.77 There are, however, similar issues of accessing this content and privacy interests 
of the deceased that might prevent the default transmission of copyright in Facebook content 
(see Section 4). 
 In addition to the copyright as an economic right, social network authors of literary or 
artistic work would be entitled to moral rights. In the UK, unless waived, therefore, users 
would have moral rights for 70 or 20 years post mortem, depending on the type of right.78 
Moral rights in the UK, in principle, transmit on death. Unless a person waives his moral 
rights (section 87 CDPA 1988), the right to be identified as author and the right to object to 
derogatory treatment of work transmit on death, passes to the person as directed by will, or a 
person to whom the copyright passes, or sits exercisable by a personal representative (section 
95 CDPA 1988). There are further relevant issues in relation to Facebook in particular. 
Facebook, for instance, does not require the waiving of moral rights in its terms of service, but 
access of a user’s heirs to this content is limited. The US Copyright Act contains similar 
provisions as to the types of moral right conferred on the authors. However, these rights 
expire on the author’s death and therefore are not applicable to our issue of post-mortem 
transmission of copyright in email content.79 
 In summary, a large and indeterminable portion of Facebook content is potentially 
copyrightable and transmits on death like any other copyrighted work, provided it has been 
published. A separate issue, explored in Section 2, is whether personal representatives and the 
next of kin can actually access this content. When the content has not been published for the 
purpose of copyright laws, and this content is primarily included in the concept of digital 
assets, there are obstacles to its transmission arising from legislation. Published content will 
arguably be accessible and the next of kin will inherit the title to this copyright, according to 
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the relevant IP and succession laws. This finding directs us to solutions suggested at the end 
of the chapter. 
<b>3.2 Property in Facebook Content 
The argument that a social network account ‘is, like any online account, intangible property’80 
oversimplifies the different features of SNSs as well as the relationships between users and 
these sites. It also favours the American approach to intangible property,81 and fails to account 
for IP as a distinct legal concept.82 
 Relying upon recent research on email content,83 based upon current copyright and property 
law, and upon the Western theories of property, email content is not the property of its users. 
It can, however, be protected by copyright, the tort of misuse of confidential information, 
trade secret doctrine, data protection or publicity rights.84 Similarly, Facebook account 
information would include non-copyrightable material, such as short phrases, single words, or 
jokes in status updates on Facebook that will not meet the requirements for copyright 
protection. Additionally, personal data represent a large amount of this content. For instance, 
there is personal data in the ‘About’ section (name, place of birth, address, education, age, 
pictures etc), but also in the user’s albums, notes, status updates etc. A vast amount of these 
data belong to the category of sensitive data (religious and political beliefs, sexual orientation 
etc).85 Conclusions regarding information and personal data contained in emails failing to 
meet the doctrinal and normative features of property are applicable here as well, as this is 
essentially the same type of information and data, perhaps only more voluminous and 
prominent.86 Consequently, having in mind the issues with property and copyright in 
Facebook content, the author maintains that the more relevant concept in relation to the legal 
nature of this content and its transmission is post-mortem privacy, discussed in Section 4. 
<a>4. POST-MORTEM PRIVACY 
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Privacy (privacy interests and the protection of personal data of deceased users) further 
complicates the issues when considering post-mortem transmission of emails and SNS 
account contents. Post-mortem privacy regulation (or the lack of it) includes ‘the right of a 
person to preserve and control what becomes of his or her reputation, dignity, integrity, 
secrets or memory after their death’.87 The new circumstances of the digital world, and in 
particular the emergence of a new and voluminous array of ‘digital assets’ created, hosted and 
shared on web 2.0 intermediary platforms, and often revealing highly personal or intimate 
personal data, suggest some level of urgency in addressing these matters. An analysis of 
comparative common and civilian law institutions, focusing on personality rights, defamation, 
moral rights and freedom of testation, confirms that there is little support for post-mortem 
privacy in common law. Conversely, personality rights in general have gained a greater 
appreciation in civilian law, including their survival after death. The notable reliance on 
contract regulation may still mean that users of US-based intermediary platforms, wherever 
they are based, are deprived of post-mortem privacy rights. Given this current state of online 
legal privacy protection, future protection may need to come from legislation, contract or 
‘code’ solutions, of which the first emergent into the market is Google Inactive Account 
Manager,88 followed by Facebook Legacy Contact. 
 It is submitted here that the normative support for post-mortem privacy can be found in 
theories of autonomy,89 privacy as autonomy90 and the freedom of testation.91 It is outside the 
scope of this chapter to explore the theories in more depth and only the main idea is outlined 
here. It is argued that autonomy in the form of testamentary freedom should be extended to 
the online world. However, as digital assets, including Facebook content, include 
predominantly information and personal data, this freedom would translate into the right to 
control one’s personal data post mortem, ie post-mortem privacy, instead of one’s property. 
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This chapter will now look at how Facebook views this theoretical position practically, in its 
policy and technological solutions. 
 Facebook refers to post-mortem privacy repeatedly (without using the term itself), when 
refusing to transfer a deceased person’s account/allow for access/memorialisation/content. It 
is important to note at the outset that Facebook must comply with the EU data protection 
legislation. As its subsidiary Facebook Ireland Limited is the provider of the services and data 
controller in the EU, the Irish data protection laws apply.92 This means that the legislation 
requires that only personal data of living individuals are to be protected by Facebook.93 In 
spite of this, in the process of memorialising an account, Facebook promises to remove 
‘sensitive information such as contact information and status updates’ in order to protect the 
deceased’s privacy.94 Another instance where Facebook allegedly protects post-mortem 
privacy is the request for a Look Back video or provision of the deceased’s account contents. 
In this case, Facebook can only provide a unique link to the deceased’s confirmed friends who 
requested the link, without an option to share it.95 Finally, their option of the Legacy Contact 
protects users’ choice and privacy, by providing for an individual’s control over their account. 
In particular, this is demonstrated in the fact that the Legacy Contact is prohibited from 
logging in into the deceased’s account and in the fact that the Contact cannot see the 
deceased’s private messages.96 
 This prima facie post-mortem friendly policy is complicated by the fact that the 
memorialisation of an account is not something that a user can opt in or opt out of, but it is a 
default if requested by a family member and in the absence of a Legacy Contact. The nexus of 
data protection regimes in the EU, and perhaps less in the US, is in the user’s informed 
decision and control over their data.97 This, in most cases, does not apply to the deceased, as 
their personal data and privacy are, generally, not protected.98 However, if Facebook wishes 
to establish this protection contractually, as they claim in their provisions, they would need to 
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provide users with meaningful information and more coherent options to control this while 
alive. 
 The crux of the issue therefore is how to balance the right of the ‘owner’ of information 
(the person who originally posted it) to control it with the rights of others who believe that 
this shared information is owned (jointly) by them. This is also where Facebook’s terms, 
forms and help pages contradict each other. Thus, whereas information may be removed from 
one’s timeline by another, when Facebook defines a user’s information this includes items 
that others have posted to the user’s timeline.99 This issue surfaced on the death of a user and, 
according to Facebook’s stance mentioned above, default memorialisation, without an opt-out 
option (with an exception of the Legacy Contact), solves the problem of maintaining the 
information on the network. 
 Post-mortem privacy, more generally, serves as an argument against the default 
transmission of Facebook account content on death without the deceased’s consent, ie through 
the laws of intestacy or by requiring the intermediaries to provide access to the deceased’s 
account. Recognition of post-mortem privacy questions, therefore, the default position of 
using transmission by way of the laws of succession for some kinds of digital assets (those 
containing a vast amount of personal data, such as Facebook accounts). Rather than using the 
current offline defaults in law, it is argued here that more nuanced solutions for the 
transmission of Facebook content are needed. These solutions will be sketched in the 
following section and would aim to account for the privacy interest of the deceased. These 
interests are currently mostly not recognised as the succession laws favour the heirs and the 
technology solution has initially favoured the interests of the surviving families too. 
<a>5. SOME SOLUTIONS FOR TRANSMISSION OF FACEBOOK CONTENT ON 
DEATH 
American states have pioneered legislation and solutions to the issues in the area of 
transmission of digital assets on death, starting with Connecticut in 2005.100 Many other states 
followed and by 2013 about half of them had enacted some sort of legislation to account for 
these issues.101 The answer to this piecemeal legislation and possible conflicts of law has been 
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harmonisation within the US under the leadership of the Uniform Law Commissions 
Committee (ULC) on Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets. 
 The final text of the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (UFADAA) was 
adopted by the ULC in July 2014 and a consensus seemed to have been achieved on its 
text.102 However, a further round of lobbying, caused by the industry’s dissatisfaction with the 
draft, resulted in a new version of the UFADAA, adopted in December 2015.103 The biggest 
difference between the two texts is in the recognition of post-mortem privacy and 
technological solutions analysed in this chapter. The Act grants priority to service providers’ 
terms of service and user choices over any other provisions, including the will.104 The final 
draft is quite revolutionary and supports the arguments with regard to post-mortem privacy 
and code-law solution for the transmission of digital assets.105 This means that the law 
recognises technology, architecture, services (or ‘code’ as described in Lessig’s seminal work 
on the Internet regulation),106 ie Facebook Legacy Contact in this case. Following Lessig’s 
approach on the efficiency of code in regulating the Internet, the technological solution to this 
problem, in the author’s view, is better suited to deal with the digital realm and the UFADAA 
rightly gives precedence to technology over intestate succession and the will. It will be 
interesting to see whether the Act will achieve a wider adoption and application in the 
individual states, or even initiate efforts in other countries. Importantly, the Act in tandem 
with tech solutions demonstrates the growth of popularity of an active post-mortem privacy 
convention in the US, which has traditionally been more conservative with respect to the 
concept of privacy in the first place. 
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 Solutions akin to the UFADAA should garner support. A combined code-law-market 
solution is the most suitable for the SNS ecosystem. The solutions exclusively based on 
different technologies and services (such as Facebook’s Legacy Contact) could conflict with 
provisions in wills, or laws of intestacy, in that the digital versions would provide for an 
option for different beneficiaries/heirs from the offline ones. It would, perhaps, include 
friends and the digital community that would not be taken into account in an offline 
distribution of property (beneficiaries in a will, trust or heirs in intestate distribution). This 
further leads us to the problem identified of conflicts between the interests of the deceased 
(expressed in his digital will or traditional will), family (spouse, children, parents and other 
heirs) and friends (with whom the deceased might have firmer ties online than those with his 
heirs offline, as research suggests).107 For the reason of the different nature of relationships 
online and post-mortem privacy issues, it is argued here that the succession laws should 
generally recognise these different interests and allow for different beneficiaries to be 
designated online. 
 In English law, there is also a need for legislative changes, which would recognise 
technological solutions and prevent potential clashes with the laws of intestate succession or 
wills (Administration of Estates Act 1925 and Wills Act 1837). These provisions should 
recognise users’ technologically executed choice as a valid designation of a beneficiary for 
their social network content or against this transmission and deletion of the content. Copyright 
law should also be amended and clarified, in particular section 93 of the CDPA 1988. The 
application of this provision should be extended to digital assets, mandating that copyright in 
unpublished digital works is transmissible, provided that the user has not expressed a contrary 
wish pre-mortem, in the form of an in-service option. 
 Additionally, more explicit and clear recognition of post-mortem privacy and protection of 
the deceased’s personal data by Facebook are required. This would recognise users’ autonomy 
and pre-mortem choice, which Facebook claims to foster. Practically, Facebook should make 
the existing options more obvious and a part of their core terms of service. In order to show a 
true commitment to post-mortem privacy, they should allow users to decide on whether they 
want their account to be memorialised, deactivated or some of the content/all of it transferred 
on death. To achieve this, they could prompt users regularly and come up with some 
innovative technological solutions, as they do with regard to their interface/functionalities etc. 
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This would not be entirely new to Facebook, as they have devised a tool to enable users to 
check and confirm their privacy preferences, ie ‘privacy check up tool’.108 The technology 
solution has to be followed by a clear post-mortem policy, which should build on the rationale 
adopted by Facebook so far, ie the protection of post-mortem privacy, but in a much more 
nuanced, prominent and coherent manner. 
<a>6. CONCLUSION 
Since a Facebook account as well as the underlying software is property/IP of the service 
provider, neither Facebook content nor a user’s account can be considered property of the 
user. Still, the user may retain copyright in published content, an interest that can be 
transmitted upon death, with some issues arising in Facebook’s terms of service. Unpublished 
material remains a lingering difficulty and this situation should cajole efforts to update the 
law in order to permit a deceased user’s family to acquire IP rights to user unpublished 
content on Facebook (provided the deceased has previously consented to this circumstance). 
Where material is not copyrighted, the law should prevent a deceased user’s family from 
taking over the deceased’s account on the basis of the deceased’s privacy rights. While 
technology solutions (such as Facebook Legacy Contact) are welcome, their legal recognition 
and greater consistency in the service provider’s terms of service constitute further points to 
address. The underlying rationale for this is recognising users’ autonomy and making 
technological choices that support autonomy more coherent. 
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